G. O. Parada
In the above paper, 1 the authors should be congratulated for providing an explanation of economic regulation of distribution business based on price cap and yardstick competition. However, I am not sure that the Chilean electrical distribution regulation process is a yardstick competition process. I think it should be called ideal model regulation process. On other hand the authors use the term scope economies to refer that it is much less expensive to distribute electricity with a single network than with multiple networks. I think the correct term is scale economies. Anyway, the authors have made an important contribution developing a useful tool to estimate technical and retailing costs. They raise important concerns that have not been previously discussed enough with respect to regulation of electrical distribution systems.
I have some comments and questions about 5 of the issues the authors raised and invite their responses.
1) Every regulation models permits particular behaviors (gives incentives to) and inhibits others. The traditional cost of service regulation may result in over investment while price cap model may result in a restriction to investment affecting quality of service. Although it is not a pure price cap model, the Chilean regulation process has resulted in the same restriction to investment. The opinion of authors in this regard will be interesting.
2) The actual distribution company (so called reference company)
is not really optimized to determine the model company. Only the load, its growing rate and their spatial distribution are taken into account in determining the model company. The considered load is the only part that is subject to price regulation. No environmental characteristics are taken into account for determining the distribution model company. The authors are invited to give their opinion about the environmental aspect, which has a very important influence in reliability. 3) The current tariff process (year 2000) has defined 6 typical areas.
Each typical area has different VAD and quality exigencies according to an urban/rural classification. Distribution companies are only classified in one typical area. It would be interesting to know the opinion of authors about this change, especially with regard to subsidies. 4) The boundary between transmission and distribution is the medium voltage line right outside of the HV/MV substation. Therefore, HV/MV substations are not part of the distribution business. Is it not an incentive to have longer MV lines in distribution? 5) The quality of service (reliability, power quality and client attention) of a distribution systems has a very strong dependency on the level of investment. Before September 1998 Chilean distribution sector did not have an explicit quality of service frame regulation. Therefore, 2000 is the first year in which a regulation The authors are to be commended for an interesting paper 1 on a very timely issue. The regulation of distribution companies is usually more demanding than the regulation of transport companies since in the distribution sector there is a more reduced level of technical and economic efficiency and larger investments are required. The regulatory approaches in use in the distribution sector of several countries correspond to incentive schemes as price cap, revenue cap and benchmark. In order to clarify some points and to give some highlights about the situation in Chile, we would appreciate the comments of authors on the following topics: -several regulations impose a separation between network distribution activities and commercialization as, for instance, in England and Wales and other EU countries. This splits commercialization costs from network operation and maintenance ones (thus reducing the space for disputes), it explicitly introduces competition on all activities except network ones bringing the market closer to consumers and it reduces the chances of having cross-subsidies. Don't you think that this is the adequate strategy to adopt? -such strategy would determine the separation of tariffs for the Use of Networks, for one side, and for energy or power, for the other turning the whole process more transparent. The revenues of distribution network companies are very commonly set by incentive approaches. According to our knowledge, revenue cap mechanisms are more interesting than price caps in terms of emulating market conditions and in translating the technical behavior of companies enabling a more reasonable treatment of fixed costs. Therefore, wouldn't it be also interesting to consider the evolution to a revenue cap scheme completed by a benchmark process to characterize the situation in the beginning of each regulatory period?
Manuscript investments are a crucial aspect for re-regulated distribution network companies. In some countries the attempt to maintain high profit performances is leading to investment reductions eventually meaning that the revenue setting was not properly done for a given regulatory period or that the implementation of investment plans was not adequately monitored. What is the opinion of the authors on this namely in view of the proposed regulatory scheme? -investments are required to increase the automation level of companies and to increase Quality of Service. Quality of Service is a crucial issue since it can be seen as a way to balance the relation between providers and consumers and as a powerful tool to induce or impose investments if minimum requirements are not accomplished. In view of this, how would Quality of Service Regulations fit in your proposal? What is your opinion about the effectiveness of such schemes in counteracting the trend to reduce investments in order to keep high levels of profits? The authors are to be commended once again for the comparisons provided between Chile and England and Wales and for the hybrid regulation proposal aiming at catching the most interesting properties of price cap and benchmark regulation schemes.
Discussion of "Integration of Price Cap and Yardstick
Competition Schemes in Electrical Distribution Regulation"
David E. Dismukes and Steven A. Ostrover
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent issue of Transactions, Rudnick and Donoso [1] present an analysis of the Chilean model of yardstick competition for distribution company operations. The authors compare this approach to the "price cap" scheme used for electric distribution in England and Wales. The authors complete their work by offering a hybrid methodology that attempts to combine the best methods of both regulatory approaches. This method is based upon a statistical benchmarking method included in the paper. 1 The authors' work is very timely since policy makers around the world are grappling with the issues of developing regulatory mechanisms to govern monopoly distribution operations. While defining these regulatory mechanisms is challenging in the US because of the formerly vertically integrated nature of the industry, it is especially challenging for other parts of the world, particularly those with limited experience in regulation due to the nationalized nature of their pre-restructured power industries. As the authors accurately note, international electric utility policy is recognizing the shortcomings of rate of return regulation. The real challenge, however, is to design a scheme that replaces a tried and true method, despite its shortcomings, with a scheme that expands and balances rewards for good distribution utility behavior. We see two issues that need to be clarified and addressed in the authors' presentation. Our first comment addresses their fundamental interpretation of the goals of regulation, while our second comment addresses the empirical methods needed to meet these regulatory objectives.
II. CLARIFICATIONS ON THE ROLE OF REGULATION IN RESTRUCTURED ENVIRONMENTS
The authors propose an adjustment to the current method of regulation in Chile that, if adopted, would most likely lead to improved results. The qualifier "most likely" reflects the always present uncertainty about whether results from an alternative method will provide an improvement over an existing, albeit flawed, regulatory regime.
It is more than a semantic quibble to highlight a mistaken interpretation embedded within the following comment:
he major tasks of distribution regulation are to ensure that tariff setting allows the company to recover its costs plus a reasonable return on its capital, taking into account the risks faced by the company, while promoting incentives to achieve greater efficiency. The traditional regulatory scheme is the rate of return regulation (ROR), that ensures the regulated distribution company a fixed return on capital, no matter its costs [1] . Throughout the course of ROR utility regulation, as practiced throughout the world, there has not been, nor was there ever any intention for, a guarantee on cost recovery. Instead there has been, and there should be, an opportunity to recover prudently incurred costs. The distinction between guarantee and opportunity is an important one that highlights two fundamental, and sometimes conflicting, objectives of utility regulation.
The first regulatory objective is to compensate the monopoly provider (utility) for reasonably incurred costs including its cost of capital. The second objective is to provide the utility with incentives for cost-efficient and high-quality service. The reason these objectives are in conflict is that, as guarantees are strengthened, efficiency incentives are weakened. Economic agents are motivated by the desire to prevent a bad outcome and realize a good one. As the uncertainty in outcomes is reduced, by providing guarantees for cost recovery, motivation for reducing costs suffers. Regulators rarely have enough information to precisely determine the appropriate balance between the two. This is effectively the core dilemma in regulation.
As the authors note, however, it is fair to conclude that traditional ROR regulation has leaned more toward the principle of guarantees, and less toward those associated with offering incentives. The key to establishing financial incentives for a utility is to define a disconnect between costs and revenues. When revenues are entirely driven by costs, cost-recovery is guaranteed and financial incentives disappear. A disconnect can be defined in two ways: cross sectionally and or temporally. A cross-sectional disconnect implies the use of an external reference point (i.e., something other than the utility being reviewed) for determining allowable costs. A temporal disconnect refers to a situation whereby revenues and utility costs are not reconciled each year.
Both of these features have always, to some extent, characterized the implementation of ROR regulation. The existence of regulatory lag, which is nothing more than an intentional or unintentional delay in comprehensive rate review, establishes a temporal disconnect. Prudence reviews, whereby the reasonableness of incurred costs are assessed, are driven by a comparison of a utility's cost structure with a subjectively-defined model for efficiency based upon observations of other utilities' performance.
The advance in the art of regulation introduced by so-called incentives schemes, as practiced for instance in the United Kingdom and Chile, has been to formalize these two disconnects as standardized parts of the process. In the UK, where allowable revenues are initially established with reference to actual utility costs, and then automatically adjusted by formula over time, the intention has been to establish a temporal disconnect. In Chile, with its focus on the "economically adapted" (i.e., efficient) system, a cross-sectional emphasis has been added. Both systems have indeed established improved financial incentives relative to traditional ROR regulation.
But these are differences in degree, not in basic form. They reflect a preference for relatively more incentives and relatively less guarantees. The basic character of the regulatory tradeoff is unchanged. In particular, as incentives have increased, cost recovery and profitability have become less certain. And this can, and has for that matter, cut both ways. While the authors focus on the problems in Chile, where revenues have tended to be less than actual utility costs, UK regulators and customers will be surprised to see their recent experience, where revenues after privatization were much greater than costs, not given equal space. These experiences are simply mirror-images of the same basic problem.
When revenues diverge substantially from actual costs within an incentive-based framework, there are two distinct "boundary" possibilities: 1) allowable revenues have been set correctly and utility performance has been significantly better of worse than should be reasonably expected; or 2) allowable revenues have been set incorrectly. Much like traditional regulation, incentive-based systems are designed with confidence in the regulator's ability to define the appropriate model for efficiency. The divergence of actual costs from allowed revenue, therefore, raises the question that cuts to the core of the rationale for incentive regulation: is a regulatory model more reflective of "efficient" results than actual utility performance?
The UK government provided its answer when it imposed a one-time windfall profits tax to claw back what was perceived as excess utility profits. This is an extremely blunt policy instrument that simply reacted to a perceived inequity while doing nothing to alter the basic mechanics of the system. In contrast, the authors propose a structural adjustment to the existing process in Chile that, for the portion of the utility cost structure they are concerned with (operating costs), shifts the focus from external models to historical results. They assert, with support from their econometric analysis, that their proposal will "minimize divergences between the regulator (model) and the regulated companies' (actual results)." This is true so long as the a priori determined econometric model is specified accurately.
III. THE MECHANICS OF BENCHMARKING PERFORMANCE: REGRESSION TO THE MEAN VERSUS BEST PRACTICES
There is a mechanical problem associated with the authors' proposal to use a linear regression model to benchmark utility performance for regulatory purposes. Using the results from such a model as a measure of efficiency is somewhat limiting since a linear regression, by definition, produces an estimate of the average relationship that best fits the data. Averages, however, are incongruent to the economic theory of production (or costs), whereby the estimated function traces out the least cost locus for varying output, the maximum output for varying input levels, or minimum costs given output levels. Hence, the standard production function represents maximum output levels given fixed input levels.
The typical cost function frontier used in these types of analysis can be generalized as:
where w is the vector of exogenously determined input prices, and x is a vector of inputs. This equation defines the minimum expenditure needed to produce a given level of output, q. Specific functional forms applied to this relationship usually include Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution (CES), or more flexible functional forms like translog cost functions. In addition, more ad hoc models that exclude pre-defined functional forms have also been presented in the literature.
Despite differences in model specification, the general approach of using a traditional linear regression highlights the fact that the benchmark used for regulatory purposes is set at an average instead of best practices. This is incongruent with not only economic theory, but also the goals of incentive regulation, which should be set in a manner that rewards utilities for exceptional, not average, performance since, in theory, their allowed rates of return should already account for and reward average performance characteristics.
Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt [2] present a variation of traditional single equation regression models that corrects for the average nature of most specifications and can be used in instances, like the one proposed by the authors, where a "best practices" estimate is the relevant focus. This specification, known as a parametric frontier, posits that the output of each firm is bounded above by an efficiency frontier. The stochastic nature of the model allows this frontier to vary randomly by firm, recognizing that some cost deviations may not be the result of firm behavior. The model also compares firm performance relative to its own estimated efficiency frontier as opposed to a sample mean.
A significant advantage in the parametric frontier approach rests with the treatment of the errors and the implications these have on cost performance. Deviations from the efficiency frontier can be the result of two influences. The first, as mentioned earlier, can be described as an exogenous shock that, either favorable or unfavorable, is beyond the control of a firm. The second, and most important, source of error is associated with inefficient levels of output or cost that are within the firm's control. These errors are the ones most closely associated with traditional inefficiency and can be estimated as the percentage by which firms are exceeding their estimated cost frontier.
A compact formulation of the parametric cost frontier can be given by:
where C total cost, Q output, and P a set of input prices. The composed error term is defined as (v + u) where v is normally distributed with mean zero, and u is defined as the inefficiency residual with flexible assumptions about its distribution.
Another empirical approach that could be useful in the determination of standards for benchmarking utility performance rests with a linear programming method known as data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA was first introduced by Charnes, et al., [3] , [4] and since that time it has been widely used as a method to derive the technical efficiency of both private and public firms. The method has recently been used by Pollitt [5] , [6] in an international comparison of unbundled utility operations including distribution cost performance. Pollitt's work compares two approaches: 1) a standard linear regression model using an ad hoc, rather than translog, empirical specification versus 2) a DEA analysis of transmission and distribution costs of international utilities. His research goal was to determine if there were any significant differences between not only the methods (i.e., regression versus DEA), but also in the best practices of public versus privately held firms.
DEA is similar to the parametric frontier analysis in the sense that it uses best practice observations to trace out a least-cost operating locus. Its main difference, however, is that as a deterministic method (i.e., nonstochastic), it makes no adjustments for random noise, and is highly sensitive to a small number of outlier observations. DEA uses the linear programming method to search for the optimal combinations of outputs and inputs. In cost applications, DEA seeks the minimum cost associated with the highest level of outputs. The method optimizes on each individual observation with the objective of calculating a discrete piecewise frontier. This is in contrast to the focus of statistical approaches on averages and parameter estimation. A significant benefit of the DEA approach is the opportunity to not pre-specify a functional relationship for production, and it is relatively easy to handle the case of multiple inputs and outputs.
IV. CONCLUSION
By this section, we hope that readers of our comment have an appreciation for the difficulty of developing effective incentive regulation regimes for restructured industries. As we noted earlier, despite the well recognized shortcomings of traditional ROR regulation, there have always been checks on its most severe shortcoming of inadequate financial incentives (i.e., regulatory lag, prudence reviews). While not perfect, these checks help explain why the system has worked for so many decades. Nevertheless, anyone remotely familiar with the process must admit that there are opportunities for improving the system through more incentive-based mechanisms-particularly for countries leaping into a system of privatization and creation of new regulatory institutions.
One point that we would like to make exceptionally clear is that incentive regulation should award excess returns only where there has been exceptional, and not simply average, utility performance. Granting incentive returns for average performance, regardless of their magnitude, is nothing more than placing old wine in new bottles. Such an approach grafts the historic tendency toward guarantees into a new form of regulation that not only accepts unremarkable performance, but encourages it.
Methods that measure performance for benchmarking purposes should be designed to support this overarching goal of rewarding only exceptional, not average, performance. Simple (unadjusted) linear regression methods benchmark performance to the average and not to best practices. Failure to facilitate methods reflecting best practices is nothing more than a "regression" toward past regulatory practices engineered through sophisticated statistical methods.
Discussion of "Integration of Price Cap and Yardstick Competition Schemes in Electrical Distribution Regulation"
Alberto Vargas
Congratulations to the authors of the above paper 1 for an important contribution to distribution tariffs calculation. It is important to highlight the necessity to implement methodologies for calculation of electric tariffs of distribution in Latin American countries. This will assure in the future the smallest costs for customers through a greater efficiency of the companies, if the principle of economic fairness is respected. Both Chile and Peru use the concept of the "Model Company," which has risen controversies, some still unsolved, mainly in the determination of the operational costs. The lack of a reliable methodology to determine the operational costs causes a great dispersion that significantly affects the VAD and therefore the tariffs. The proposal of the authors of replacing the "Model Company" with an econometric model to evaluate and to determine the operational costs is interesting. It is important that the signals of efficiency for the companies are not based on a completely idealized and independent model, difficult to reach in a few years. This is the case of the "Model Company," but rather should gradually reflect the tendency of the cost components in the market. Although this approach could result in greater costs for the best companies as in the short term just as the authors show in Fig. 3 , it establishes relatively more acceptable signals among companies. This is an aspect that the idealized "Model Company" basically doesn't consider, which normally is not accepted.
Although the econometric model proposed shows results and an acceptable adjustment, it does not include an important variable, that is the quality of technical service. This last aspect holds a good relationship with the investments in assets and also with the operational costs and maintenance, mainly in crew and equipment. Finally it is not observed for the case of companies with two or more typical areas, how the econometric model would be applied since the variables are applied at the level of the companies. Otherwise the average of the variables would not have the same effect as considering the composition in a typical areas of the company. Publisher Item Identifier S 0885-8950(01)09820-0.
Discussion of "Integration of Price Cap and Yardstick Competition Schemes in Electrical Distribution
Regulation" 1 
G. Strbac
The authors views on the following issues would be appreciated.
A. From Asset to Performance Based Regulation
Historically, approaches to regulating distribution have generally placed more emphasis on cost associated with running a distribution business (input) rather than on the performance and quality of distribution services, such as number of interruptions, their duration and the response which customers receive (output). As part of the recent distribution price control review British regulator, OFGEM, acknowledged that some work was needed to address some of the weaknesses associated with the present price regulation framework (RPI-X). This has led to the introduction of OFGEM's "Information and Incentives Project" (IIP). The principal objective of the IIP is to establish a framework under which quality of supply will be properly valued and incentivized. This initiative is also intended to drive the service quality toward customer needs and to enable comparisons of the companies' relative performance to be established. Finally, the IIP should provide a structure in which the companies' performance will matter sufficiently to give them a continual incentive for improvement. This regulatory initiative attempts to mimic the concept of benchmark regulation and intends to compare companies with respect to various composite efficiency and performance indices (rather than compare it with its reference model). It is the view of discusser that it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to establish a reliable, consistent and level playing field for measuring and comparing cost and performance across different companies. This is because the cost and performance are influenced by many factors such as geography and topography of the area, the number, nature and density of customers, the lengths and types of distribution circuits, weather conditions, asset replacement cycles, inherited network characteristics (pre-vesting investment) etc., which may be unique for each particular company. Secondly, the issue of "value for money" i.e., the ability of approach to mirror competitive markets, where companies offering higher quality can charge higher prices, seems difficult and remains to be seen how this issue will be addressed.
B. Treatment of Losses
Since de-regulation of electricity industry, distribution network owners and operators have been exposed to a spectrum of complex conflicting objectives to: reduce capital expenditure, reduce operating cost, improve reliability and service quality and offer the service at lower prices. These pressures, accompanied by strong short-term objectives, have resulted in a trend to increase the life of the existing plant and to drive the assets ever harder. Within the present regulatory climate the replacement policies for transformers and distribution circuits, both cable and overhead line, are primarily concerned with cost of investment while the cost of losses tends not to be given adequate consideration. It is important to bear in mid that losses in distribution networks are not insignificant and that replacement strategies should take losses into consideration, in order to ensure minimum long term electricity prices. The main concern here is whether the short term objectives of the network developers, coupled with potentially inadequate regulatory incentives for investment into high efficiency distribution plant, may result in the installation of inefficient plant which will then be in operation for the next 30 years. Power systems of European countries were significantly expanded during the late 1950s and early 1960s and the assets then installed now approach the end of their useful life and will need to be replaced in not too distant future, and it vitally important that replacement strategy is carefully chosen. There is however now some evidence that distribution companies tend to replace aging plant with new but inefficient (high loss transformers and inadequate size circuits) due to weak regulatory incentives related to loss management.
C. Treatment of Dispersed Generation
In the UK, allocation of costs to the network users has, largely, been left in the hands of the distributors with the regulator having no direct influence over the prices charged to individual customer. Distribution companies largely use conventional pricing models that attempts to identify costs attributable to different customer groups domestic, industrial and commercial. On the other hand, one of the basic objectives of the ongoing reforms of electricity supply industries around the world is to promote competition in the generation and retail segments of the industry. Both generators and retailers require access to network services and therefore, a necessary pre-condition for competition to develop is open and nondiscriminatory access to transmission and distribution networks by all. Electricity prices at wholesale electricity market in UK, average at about 2-2.5 p/kWh while the retail price of electricity is currently about 6-7 p/kWh. Transmission and distribution networks, together with the supply business are responsible for the difference between retail and wholesale prices. With energy provided much closer to the load, the value of dispersed kWh may be higher since the costs of "bought-in" network services to facilitate product delivery from point of purchase to point of sale, is likely to be considerably lower. What is important to recognize is that the issue of competitiveness of embedded generation is a network pricing problem. At present however, distribution network pricing, conceptualized for passive distribution networks, does not recognize this impact and is not able to facilitate competition in generation. Clearly, location specific impact of dispersed generation cannot be captured by the generic cost allocation scheme currently used and this considerably disadvantages the competitiveness of dispersed sources.
Closure to Discussion of "Integration of Price Cap and Yardstick Competition Schemes in Electrical Distribution
Regulation"
H. Rudnick and J. Donoso
We thank the discussers for their contributions and for bringing new dimensions to the subject of monopoly electricity distribution regulation. We are convinced that paper discussions not only allow to highlight strengths and weaknesses of a reported research, but contribute H. Rudnick and J. Donoso are with Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Casilla 306, Correo 22, Santiago, Chile (e-mail: h.rudnick@ieee.org).
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with new avenues and directions to follow. We will attempt to respond to most of the questions and complement the paper. 1 Incentive Regulation: The recent interest in incentive regulation is not due to new contributions from economic theory, but because of the need for practical solutions that many times have resulted in design and implementation of regulatory arrangements that are not necessarily in line with the theory. In that perspective, benchmarking has been broadly defined as comparison of some measure of actual performance against a reference or benchmark performance [1] .
Besides doing theoretical and analytical research on the subject, the authors have been involved directly with the processes of building reference efficient model companies for Chile. We are thus fully aware of the advantages and limitations of the scheme, which Dismukes and Ostrover clearly and didactilly summarize in their discussion. We agree with them that rate of return regulation has not had the intention to always guarantee cost recovery, but the risk of the Averch Johnson effect, where firms are given incentives to employ too much capital, is real and, often, very subtle. We defend the model company, particularly in relation to capital investment, as a better alternative to other schemes that are much more vulnerable to information asymmetries. The subject of information asymmetries is most relevant [12] . It is not possible to regulate monopolies, and to define their tariffs, without information from the real firms [3] . But the firms have the incentive to strategically manipulate the information they provide to achieve monopolistic prices. Therefore, we assign much importance to the way the adopted regulatory scheme handles these information asymmetries and subtracts and protects itself from their perverse influences.
Our proposal for changes to that model, while pretending to improve it in the field of operational costs, makes it more dependent on company information. Crosschecks comparing with efficient management in other industries could be used to reduce that dependence. We agree with Dismukes and Ostrover that there are significant differences between average benchmarking and frontier benchmarking [1] . We also agree that our econometric models could be significantly improved. Nevertheless, we must emphasize that the econometric adjustments shown in the paper, compare firms with different characteristics, but the percentages of cost reduction are calculated relative to the best-evaluated firm in each cost category. The aim is to achieve the best practice adjustment, rather than granting incentive returns for average performance. There are firms with lower costs than the model adjustment and positive X factors (and reduction). Only the best-evaluated firm has an X factor equal to zero, all other have positive reduction factors.
Cost and Revenues:
The cost and revenue dilemma faced in the UK, as indicated by Dismukes and Ostrover, has not been absent in the Chilean process. While efforts have centered on trying to identify the true cost of an efficient provision of the distribution service, concern has often arisen on the high profits achieved by the distribution firms. The distribution firms have been called the "milking cows" of the electricity business, with the regulatory process reducing their tariffs over time, and nevertheless their earnings increasing. While the benchmarking method considers a 10% yearly return for the distribution industry, the two largest firms have had returns over 20 to 30% [2] . Critics of the regulation have pointed that firms are not transferring their efficiency increases to final consumers.
Revenue cap mechanisms, as suggested by Dismukes, Ostrover, Saraiva and Ponce de Leão, could be a path to face that problem. However, rather than attempting to control firm revenues, the Chilean process has centered on trying to identify the truly efficient cost. An issue that continues to be relevant is how to separate regulated business from unregulated ones (and separating investment and management required by each). Reference [2] indicates that 55% of the profits of the distribution firms come from other unregulated business, so that it is essential to identify shared use of resources, particularly when the firm will have the incentive to shift costs from the unregulated to the regulated business in order to obtain high prices [3] . Another issue is how to identify economies of scope and economies of scale.
With those concerns in mind, the Chilean regulator made a dramatic change in the application of the regulation in the year 2000. Rather than emphasizing the identification of the efficient cost of distributing electricity for a given load density (and its economies of scope), it emphasized the identification of economies of scale at the firm level (for example identifying how large firms obtain inputs at lower cost than small firms). As engineers, we understand the term economies of scope linked with the concept of cost subadditivity, where one firm supplying electricity to all consumers in one area, provides a service more cheaply than two or more firms. Subadditivity is not the same as economies of scale. We understand the term economies of scale to represent the condition where the average cost in an industry falls as the output rises, usually resultant of technology. For example, a 500 kV transmission line has economies of scale, as its average cost is much lower than that of a 110 kV line. We thus understand there are economies of scope in distribution and economies of scale in transmission.
We agree with Olguín that the 2000 decision to depart from the concept of identifying costs for different densities and integrate the process at the firm level has the clear risk of introducing subsidies from low cost distribution (say highly concentrated downtown areas) to high cost one (say semi rural areas). The authority in Chile indicated that this would be corrected when setting tariffs based on those costs. Vargas expresses a similar concern in relation to our proposal to use econometric models for operational costs at the level of companies. Criteria would have to be defined to prorate them for different typical areas within each company.
Yardstick Competition and Cost Factors:
The question was made on whether the model company scheme is a yardstick competition one. In the yardstick method, first proposed by Shleifer [11], the performance of a regulated firm is compared against that of a group of comparable utilities. It can be used to promote indirect competition among regulated utilities operating in geographically separate markets. As recognized by Tooraj and Pollitt [1] , the Chilean scheme is a version of that approach, where the value added for the distribution services for a group of comparable firms is derived from a designed efficient model or reference firm. The real firms have a yardstick, against which they compete, in the representative model firms. It is the efficient technology, the efficient engineering designs, the efficient management, which serve as benchmarks in that comparison.
Strbac and Olguín pose questions on the difficulty to represent diverse factors such as geography and topography, environment and the weather, density and nature of load, etc., in performance based regulation for the electricity distribution service. We are convinced that the advantages of determining benchmarks that apply to a few typical areas (defined essentially on load density characteristics) are superior to a path where tariffs need to be defined separately for each firm or distribution area, taking into account their unique service environment. Few yardsticks should be used and the correction for differences should be the exception rather than the rule.
In the model company, a balance must be achieved between capital expenditure, service requirements and the cost of losses, among several factors. The real firms may reduce their level of losses increasing their revenue, but requiring higher investment, while increases in losses will reduce investments but also revenues. The incentives should drive to an optimal balance. Losses should not be an objective on their own, nor loss management, as suggested by Strbac, be directed by specific incentives. Different has been the case in relation to nontechnical losses (euphemism for theft) in Latin America, where tariffs after privatization recognized certain loss levels but provided incentives for their reduction.
Quality of Service: Olguín, Saraiva, Ponce de Leão and Strbac had questions on the way to introduce quality of service in the model company building process and on its control. They point that the incentive for the firm is to reduce costs by reducing investment and quality of service. The quality of service level that must be provided by the distributor to the final consumer is a definition that has to be made in advance by the regulator, whether based on international standards or experience, whether based on an economic analysis of the balance between quality and price. Once it is defined, the assessment of tariffs through the model company must include the investments needed to ensure that level of quality. Our experience indicates that higher investments for quality arise mainly in the primary network (feeder level) rather than on the secondary system. Once the quality level is defined, the required efficient investment determined, and tariffs built based on that, the need arises for quality control on the part of the regulator or a supervisory institution. Firms must be penalized if the quality level requirements included in tariffs are not met, with consumers compensated for bad service. However, the regulator must assure that penalizations are consistent with the quality level considered for tariff setting.
We agree with Vargas that incorporating explicitly the quality of service in the econometric models for operational costs and maintenance is not simple. A good understanding of the effects of different quality levels on costs in needed to impose changes in requirements.
Commercialization and Network Pricing: Separating the wire business from the customer service, through creating the commercialization agent is advantageous, as indicated by Saraiva and Ponce de Leão, with competition among those new agents benefiting final customers. It also reduces regulatory needs, as part of the supply chain is left to competition, reducing regulatory disputes. The introduction of commercialization is been considered in Chile, but the need for clear use of wire charges is required before it can be implemented. The same model company scheme and its resultant tariffs could be used, but separating the wire business cost. Our assessment indicates that from the final value added cost, only around 60% corresponds to the wire business (including 48% that corresponds to the electric network).
We agree with Strbac that distribution network pricing is also relevant for the desired development of dispersed generation. A new understanding of the distribution network services has to be developed, evolving from passive loads to active embedded generation. However, it is essential to recognize that there is a tradeoff between location incentives given if the regulator considers network position to calculate wire charges and simplicity of postage stamp approaches without location elements.
